

NILES' WEEKLY REGISTER.

FOURTH SERIES. No. 9—VOL. XIV.] BALTIMORE, APRIL 30, 1836. [VOL. L. WHOLE No. 1,284

THE PAST—THE PRESENT—FOR THE FUTURE.

EDITED, PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H. NILES, AT \$5 PER ANNUM, PAYABLE IN ADVANCE.

A valuable report from the secretary of war is inserted in the present sheet—and a report, of a similar character, concerning the navy, shall also have a place speedily.

Mr. Clay made a brilliant and powerful effort on Tuesday last in favor of his great land bill, and on Wednesday it was ordered to a third reading, 25 to 21, in the senate. This is, probably, the last important act of his public life—for we learn that he is about to retire from his seat in congress; and to have adjusted and carried through this imposing question, with its beneficent results, (the effects of which will, probably, be happily felt for years to come), is, indeed, "glory enough" for one man.

Pending the discussion on the land bill, before the U. States senate, Mr. Clay made the following statements relative to the population of the new states, to show their annual increase between the years 1820 and 1850:

Illinois (he said) had increased eighteen and a half per cent. per annum; Alabama, fourteen; Indiana, thirteen and a third; Missouri, eleven; Mississippi, upwards of eight; Ohio, six, and Louisiana, four per cent. per annum; whereas, Delaware had increased but a half per cent. per annum. The average rate of increase of the whole population of the United States during that period was about thirty-two per cent. which was exceeded by Illinois at the average rate of one hundred and fifty-three per cent. (her average being one hundred and eighty-five per cent.) and by Alabama one hundred per cent. and by Louisiana, the lowest, eight per cent. The average of the seventeen old states was twenty-five per cent. and the new states, sixty per cent. more than that amount.

The St. Louis Bulletin of the 11th instant states that in the course of the preceding week upwards of five thousand emigrants and strangers landed in that city.

The ice bridge at Quebec continued firm at last accounts, (April 14th), and it is supposed would remain so to the 1st, if not till the 10th May. There is at present more ice in Lake Erie than has been known at this season, in twenty years. The upper end of the lake is entirely closed.

[N. Y. Com. Ad.

The Montreal Gazette of Thursday, April 14th, states that large quantities of snow fell the preceding day, and on that morning it lay several inches deep on the ground. The roads across the river still continue to be used by the farmers from the opposite shore.

The banks of Cincinnati have come to the conclusion not to receive the notes of any of the banks out of that city. This, as it is stated in the Cincinnati Whig, causes the paper of other banks to be from 1 to 5 per cent. below par, which presents a "glorious" harvest for the brokers.

The surplus money in the deposit banks continues to increase. By the latest returns, according to a report of the secretary of the treasury to the senate, the amount in the affiliated banks to the credit of the treasurer of the United States was \$33,294,024 and the amount to the credit of public officers \$3,477,252; making a total amount of public money of thirty-six million seven hundred and seventy-one thousand dollars in the deposit banks, subject to the absolute and uncontrolled pleasure of the president of the United States as to the particular banks who shall enjoy the advantages of these deposits, the amount of which in some instances far exceeds the whole capital of the bank.

[Nat. Intel.

THE LAND BILL. Mr. Clay addressed the senate yesterday in support of this great measure—the bill to distribute among the several states the net proceeds of the sales of the public lands. We thought, after hearing the able and comprehensive arguments of Messrs. Ewing, Southard and White, in favor of

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this beneficent measure, that the subject was exhausted; that, at any rate, but little new could be urged in its defence. Mr. Clay, however, in one of the most luminous and forcible arguments which we have ever heard him deliver, placed the subject in new lights, and gave to it new claims to favor. He was not only strong and eloquent, as he ever is, but he was clear and perspicuous in the most complex parts of his argument. Indeed, the whole train of his reasoning appeared to us a series of demonstrations; and we cannot conceive how any mind open to conviction could have listened to it unconvinced.

A large portion of the members of the other house, we were glad for their own sakes, were present during the whole speech; and the galleries were crowded to excess by great numbers of ladies as well as gentlemen.

[National Intelligencer of Wednesday.

The reporter for the Baltimore Chronicle, in reference to the same subject, says—

Mr. Clay then addressed the senate, although suffering under considerable indisposition, and spoke the whole of the afternoon. He went over the whole ground, which he has gone over before and enforced his remarks by new facts and illustrations. At about 3 o'clock he expressed a doubt whether his strength would suffice to carry him through the fatigue. Many senators showed a disposition to move an adjournment, but he emphatically cried out "no—no—I will get through or die." He went on about half an hour longer, when he concluded, after speaking about two hours and forty minutes.

It is supposed that the sales of land, in Michigan, alone, will amount to three millions of dollars, in the present year—1836.

The National Intelligencer of Monday says—

A resolution introduced by Mr. Benton, to require payments for the public land to be made hereafter in specie, gave rise to an animated debate in the senate on Saturday, which had not terminated at the hour of adjournment, and may therefore be continued to-day. Besides the question presented by the resolution, which is of itself one of very deep interest to the western states, and to all the future purchasers of public lands, the debate extended to the merits of the fatal vetoes and other executive experiments on the finances of the country, which add importance as well as interest to the discussion. We shall endeavor to give the debate at an early day.

THE COURSE OF TRADE. Under this caption the editor of the Cincinnati Gazette states that the canal and lake communication with New York, from the Ohio river, and all its contiguous country, is beginning to lessen in importance. The course of the seasons and the distance combine to place this channel of business behind the more direct one already open from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. It is added that a great proportion of the goods purchased in New York, this season, by western merchants, have found their way to their destination by way of Philadelphia and Baltimore. Goods have also been shipped for Chicago, on the lakes, by way of New Orleans, the Mississippi, Ohio and Illinois rivers. It cannot fail to be obvious to every one that the completion of a rail road from Baltimore to the Ohio river must change all this. Not a bale of goods will be subjected to the expense, risk and delay of a transportation of thousands of miles, when it can be conveyed to the store of the purchaser in less than so many hundreds.

Albany, (N. Y.) April 23. The bill loaning the credit of the state for three millions of dollars to the New York and Erie rail road company has become a law. We congratulate the stockholders of this company, as well as the citizens of the sequestered counties through which this road is to pass, upon a result so auspicious to their hopes, and from which we trust all their anticipations of public and personal advantage may be realized.

We have not been, as our readers may recollect, among the advocates of rail roads as a general means of improvements. Nor are we even yet convinced that they will meet the expectation of their friends. But the system has grown into general favor, and it will be brought to the "test of scrutiny and of time."

We are entirely satisfied that the New York and Erie rail road will be constructed. Indeed, it is already in the progress of construction, and will be prosecuted with all the diligence and alacrity that can be secured by enterprise and liberality.

[Ev. Journal.

Texas. The Charleston Southern Patriot, commenting on the evils of the present system of disposing of the public lands, thus illustrates one of the objections:

"Another ill effect of these monopoly practices is, that government becomes embroiled with foreign countries, whose territory is contiguous to our own. The contest now waging in Texas is a case in point. The standard of independence in that country has been raised for the benefit of land speculators, who thus turn the enthusiasm of our youth for liberty and for the excitement of arms to their own account. The names of freedom and independence are prostituted to selfish ends, and the adventurous and enterprising, instead of pursuing the ordinary paths of industry, are led off into wild schemes for the sudden acquisition of wealth, but which are likely to terminate in disappointment, if not in ruin and ignominious death."

From the *National Intelligencer* of yesterday—

We copy from the government paper of yesterday a treaty with the republic of Mexico, the ratifications of which, it appears, were exchanged no longer ago than the 20th instant. The object of this treaty is to revive an obsolete provision in the treaty negotiated with Mexico in 1825, and ratified in 1832, for ascertaining and marking the boundary line between the territory of Mexico (Texas in part) and the United States. Each party is to appoint a commissioner and surveyor for that purpose, and both governments solemnly engage to provide any force that may be necessary to protect the commissioners and surveyors in carrying the object of the treaty into effect.

It is a remarkable circumstance that the ratifications of this renewal of a treaty of limits—this solemn pledge of amity, with Mexico, should be exchanged at the very moment when friends of the administration, aye, and pretty high officers under the government too, are arming bodies of men, and encouraging them to march into the very territory which the government is by treaty recognising as within the undoubted limits of Mexico.

[We do not think it necessary to insert this supplementary treaty. Its sole purpose is described in the preceding.]

Treasury department, comptroller's office, 19th Nov. 1832.

Sir: I have received your letter of the 8th instant, stating that different opinions had lately been expressed as to the construction of the 47th section of the collection law of 2d March, 1793; that is to say whether goods of the growth, produce or manufacture of the United States exported and sold in a foreign country, and afterwards imported into the United States, still preserve their original character, and can thus be imported free of duty; or whether they ought, after such sale in a foreign country, to be considered as foreign stock and subject to duty accordingly.

In reply, I have to observe that when such goods are exported from the United States and brought back without having been sold in a foreign country they are considered to be entitled to the exemption provided for in the 47th section of the act referred to, but when an actual sale of the goods is made in a foreign country, such goods must be considered as becoming amalgamated with the general mass of property of such country, and on being imported into the United States can no longer claim the exemption in question, but must be regarded in the light of foreign goods and subjected to duty accordingly. Respectfully,
Signed Jos. ANDERSON, comptroller.

Peter Saily, esq. collector, Champlain.

GRANDILOQUENCE! The writer of a letter published in the *Richmond Enquirer*, speaks as follows:

Dirwiddie Court House, April 18.

"Dear sir: The election in this county took place today, and we are happy to inform you of its result, which we do while the last knell of *white-washed whigism* is yet sounding in our ears. Democracy has firmly clung together; *not one* has deserted the faith or departed from the post of duty. Yes! we have triumphantly carried the day 'in this fiercely fought field,' (where we have been so often vanquished), against this indefatigable Protean band of whig spirits, who have assumed the variegated hues of blue, grey, black and white, any thing and every thing to accomplish our defeat. *But the conquering wave of democracy has rolled over old Dirwiddie, wave by wave, CATARACT after CATARACT,*" until the heresies which were permitted once to taint her fair and earthly faith, are emphatically *bleached, RESCINDED, EXPUNGED.* The polls closed thus:

Alfred J. Vaughan.....319
Edward Johnson.....243

Majority.....76

The whole number of votes are less than half the number that are given at a *ward* election in Baltimore! "*Cataract after cataract*" indeed!

A North Carolina paper calls Virginia a *Dutch colony*, supposing her to belong to Van Buren. But, says the *Richmond Whig*—"Wait awhile, friend. You will repent the sneer in November."

VIRGINIA. The elections are now all over, but the returns and particulars are not stated: nor is it certainly known which party has succeeded in obtaining a majority in the house of delegates, or a majority of the voters. It will, however, be a close election. The administration papers, so far, claim a majority of *two*, and say that parties stand 38 to 36; whereas the whig papers claim 41 whigs and 37 for "Van Buren."

RHODE ISLAND ELECTION. *John B. Francis*, (anti-masonic and Van Buren), has been elected governor of Rhode Island, by a majority of more than 800 votes, over *Tristram Burges*, whig. A majority of both branches of the legislature were chosen of the same politics as the governor.

Lowell. The late election for mayor of this city was very animated. The administration candidate was Mr. Postmaster Case. The vote thrown was the largest ever given in that place. Whole number 1,845—Bartlett (whig) 958—Case (administration) 867—Scattering 20, all whig. Bartlett's majority over Case 91. Entire whig vote 978—administration do. 867. Whig majority in the city 111.

The entire whig ticket for aldermen and common council was elected.

The whole vote given in Lowell last fall was 1,605—Everett 838—Morton 767. Increased vote over last fall's 240.

CONNECTICUT. According to the official return, gov. Edward's majority over Gideon Tomlinson, (whig), in the state, is 2,646. Whittlesey, the Van Buren candidate for congress, has a majority of 3,348 over Mr. Booth.

The mail from Washington to New York now starts from the former at 3 o'clock, P. M. arrives at the latter at 11 o'clock, P. M. This is a sufficient rapidity of motion.

On Sunday morning last, *R. Henry* esq. consul of France for Baltimore, was found dead in his chamber, suspended by the neck from the tester of the bed, by means of a handkerchief. It appears from the examination made by the jury of inquest, that a first attempt to put an end to his life failed in consequence of the breaking of the handkerchief with which he had endeavored to hang himself, and that a second handkerchief was used before he succeeded in his fatal purpose. He had been, for some time, under great depression of spirits.

Polomac fisheries. It is estimated that not less than three hundred wagons were in town yesterday morning at one time, for fish. They met with ready sale and good prices for the produce brought in, and procured their supplies in fine order and at comparatively low rates. [*Alex. Gaz.*]

Employments of females. The great variety of neat and profitable employments in which girls and young women in this part of the country, can now engage, renders it extremely difficult to procure good family help, or hire females at all, without giving prices comparatively high. The girls employed in the cotton and woollen factories in this town, though kept at work too many hours, are well paid for their labor. An overseer of one of the Newton factories informed us, a short time since, that two or three skillful weavers in his town made about five dollars per week beside their board, and many others averaged three and four dollars. The manufacture of silk in this town, will be principally performed by females.

[*Dedham Patriot.*]

[This "employment of females" is one of the secrets of the wealth of New England—and the girls are much the better for it.]

FOREIGN NEWS.

London dates of the 17th March.

The Carlow election committee had reported, exonerating Mr. O'Connell from the charges brought against him.

The prince consort of Portugal had arrived in London.

The citadel at Plymouth had been destroyed by fire; the town major and his two daughters perished in the flames.

A diplomatic envoy is said to have been despatched to Cracow, by the British government to report on the recent military occupation of that city by the Russians, Austrians and Prussians.

In the French chamber of deputies the motion for a political amnesty, in favor of prince Polignac and his fellow prisoners, was lost by a large majority, on the ground that it is the prerogative of the king to originate acts of mercy.

The king of Prussia is said to be laboring under a species of insanity.

It was supposed in Paris that the royal clemency would soon be extended to the prisoners at Ham. A remark made by the minister of justice in the course of the debate on the motion for a political amnesty, was thought to be confirmatory of the prevalent opinion.

The elections in Spain were resulting strongly in favor of the ultra-liberals. The popularity of M. Mendizabal was still on the increase.

Nogueras, the commandant-general of Lower Arragon, is said to have been removed from his command, as a punishment for his cruelty in ordering the mother of Cabrera to be shot. This is said to have been done in consequence of the spirited remonstrances of the British minister. It is reported from Bayonne that the chief command of the royalist army is to be taken from Cordova and given once again to general Mina.

From the Liverpool correspondent of the New York Star.

You doubt the accuracy of my notions of the peculiar morality of the English aristocracy. Take a new instance:—Last month, a case of crim. con. came in the court of king's bench. Lord Langford brought an action for damage against Mr. Barrett, a tutor in his family. It was proved that his lordship had encouraged Barrett's seduction of lady Langford—connived at his own infamy, and offered him a *post obit* of £10,000 if he would allow damages in this case to go by default; as his lordship wanted a divorce from my lady! The jury gave one shilling damages; but the house of lords will not pass any divorce bill in a case of such shameless profligacy.

TWENTY-FOURTH CONGRESS—FIRST SESSION.

SENATE.

April 22. Mr. Shepley presented sundry resolutions adopted by the legislature of Maine, instructing the senators from that state to urge the adoption of an amendment of the constitution in relation to the election of president and vice president, the granting of liberal appropriations for the purpose of national defence, and the passage of measures to protect the state of Maine against foreign aggression. The resolutions were ordered to be printed.

Mr. Tomlinson, from the committee on pensions, reported, without amendment, a bill for the relief of Thankful Randall, recommending that it be rejected.

The bill for the relief of W. Bond and W. Douglass was taken up on the question of its passage, when a discussion took place, in which Messrs. Hill, Clay, Shepley, Leigh, Calhoun, White, Walker, Buchanan, King, of Ala. Davis, Hubbard and Prentiss took part; when the question was taken on the passage of the bill, by yeas and nays as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Crittenden, Davis, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Hubbard, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Preston, Rives, Robbins, Shepley, Southard, Tomlinson, Webster, White—22.

NAYS—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, Cuthbert, Ewing, of Ohio, Grundy, Hill, King, of Ala. King, of Georgia, Morris, Niles, Prentiss, Robinson, Ruggles, Swift, Tipton, Walker, Wright—21.

So the bill was passed.

Mr. Benton submitted the following resolution; which lies over for consideration:

Resolved, That, from and after the — day of —, in the year 1836, nothing but gold and silver coin ought to be received in payment for the public lands; and that the committee on public lands be instructed to report a bill accordingly.

The senate proceeded to consider the bill to appropriate the proceeds of the public lands, and granting lands to certain states.

The question being on Mr. Walker's amendment,

Mr. Walker addressed the senate at length in reply to the remarks made yesterday by Mr. Clay.

The question was then taken on the adoption of his amendment, and decided by yeas and nays, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Benton, Black, King, of Alabama, Moore, Morris, Nicholas, Robinson, Ruggles, Walker—9.

NAYS—Messrs. Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Ewing, of Ohio, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Hubbard, Kent, Leigh, McKean, Naudain, Niles, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Wall, White—26.

So the amendment was rejected.

On motion of Mr. Ewing, the senate adjourned until to-morrow.

April 23. Mr. Southard presented the petition of the corporation of Princeton college, which he advocated in especial reference to the losses suffered by that institution during the revolution.

Other matters being attended to—

The resolution of Mr. Benton, for a law requiring all payments for the public lands to be made in specie, was taken up and considered.

After a debate, in which Messrs. Benton, Webster, Niles, Ewing, of Ohio, and Calhoun took part.

Mr. King, of Alabama, moved to amend the resolution, by striking out all after "Resolved," and inserting, "that the committee on finance be instructed to inquire into the expediency of prohibiting the receipt, in payment for the public lands, of any thing but gold and silver, after the — day of —," thus changing the character of the resolution from that of an order to bring in a bill to one of mere inquiry as to the expediency of doing so.

The discussion was then further continued by Messrs. Shepley, Mangum, Calhoun and Porter; and before any question was taken, on motion of Mr. Moore, the senate adjourned.

April 25. Mr. Buchanan presented a petition from the society of Friends in Philadelphia, on the presentation of which he addressed the senate to the following effect:

Mr. Buchanan said he rose to present the memorial of the yearly meeting of the religious society of Friends, which had been recently held in the city of Philadelphia, remonstrating against the admission of Arkansas into the union, whilst a provision remained in her constitution which admits of and may perpetuate slavery. This yearly meeting embraced within its jurisdiction the greater part of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, the whole of the state of Delaware, and the Eastern Shore of Maryland. The language of this memorial was perfectly respectful. Indeed it could not be otherwise, considering the source from which it emanated. It breathed throughout the pure and Christian spirit which had always animated the society of Friends; and although he did not concur with them in opinion, their memorial was entitled to be received with great respect.

When the highly respectable committee which had charge of this memorial called upon him this morning, and requested him to present it to the senate, he had felt it to be his duty to inform them in what relation he stood to the question. He stated to them that he had been requested by the delegate from Arkansas to take charge of the application of that territory to be admitted into the union, and that he had cheerfully taken upon himself the performance of this duty. He also read to them the 8th section of the act of congress of 6th March, 1820, containing the famous Missouri compromise; and informed them that the whole territory of Arkansas was south of the parallel of 36 deg. and a half of north latitude; and that he regarded this compromise, considering the exciting and alarming circumstances under which it was made, and the dangers to the existence of the union which it had removed, to be almost as sacred as a constitutional provision. That there might be no mistake on the subject, he had also informed them that in presenting their memorial he should feel it to be his duty to state these facts to the senate. With this course on his part they were satisfied, and still continued their request that he might present the memorial. He now did so with great pleasure. He hoped it might be received by the senate with all the respect it so highly deserved. He asked that it might be read; and as the question of the admission of Arkansas was no longer before us, he moved that it might be laid upon the table. The memorial was accordingly read, and was ordered to be laid upon the table.

Mr. Webster reported the following resolution; which, on his motion, was considered and agreed to:

Resolved, That the several heads of the executive departments be directed to report to the senate their several and respective opinions upon the justice and propriety of increasing the compensation of all or any of the clerks in their respective departments, and, if they deem such augmentation proper or necessary, in any case, that they state their opinions of the reasonable amount of such augmentation.

Some other business being attended to—

The senate proceeded to consider the bill to appropriate the proceeds of the public lands, &c.

Mr. White addressed the senate at length in favor of the bill.

Mr. Walker moved to amend the bill by changing the mode of division so as to make it according to the representation in the senate and house of representatives.

After some discussion, in which Messrs. Walker, Niles, Clayton, Clay and Black participated,

The question was taken on the amendment by yeas and nays, and decided as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Benton, Ewing, of Illinois, Linn, Niles, Robinson, Walker—6.

NAYS—Messrs. Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Cuthbert, Davis, Goldsborough, Grundy, Hendricks, Hill, Hubbard, Kent, King, of Ala. King, of Georgia, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Morris, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Robbins, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tomlinson, Webster, White, Wright—37.

The senate, on motion of Mr. Clay, adjourned.

April 26. Mr. Morris presented the proceedings of a large meeting of citizens at Cincinnati, Ohio, suggesting the propriety of acknowledging Texas as an independent state, and moved its reference to the committee on foreign relations.

Mr. King, of Alabama, admitted that the situation of Texas was such as to excite the sympathy of all, but he thought it would be going too far to entertain, at present, the subject of acknowledging her independence. He moved to lay the proceedings of the meeting on the table for the present.

Mr. Walker said he hoped the proceedings would not be laid on the table. There had been various meetings in the state of Mississippi, and he should have felt it to be his duty to rise in his place, and move the consideration of the recognition of Texas, had he not felt implicit confidence in the president, and a full conviction that, whenever the proper time should arrive, if ever it did arrive, he would adopt the most wise course. He hoped the subject would be referred to the committee on foreign relations, and he did not fear that this course would commit our neutrality. It would not be an expression of the sense of the country if the petition or proceedings were laid on the table. At the time when the South American states rose to obtain their independence, the distinguished senator from Kentucky rose in his place and moved the recognition of these states. The people had viewed with horror and disgust the brutal butchery of men, women and children, and were desirous to render effectual assistance to their brethren in Texas.

Mr. Morris said he concurred with the senator from Alabama in the opinion that this was a subject which required to be touched with the most delicate caution. We ought to proceed with great caution; but he coincided with the senator from Mississippi, that the feelings of the country had been roused. He believed that these proceedings spoke not only the almost unanimous opinion of the people of Cincinnati, but also of the state. He was willing, however, that the proceedings should be laid on the table for the present, in order to wait for further indications of public opinion, and to see if there was any other evidence of the kind sufficient to induce the senate to take up the subject for consideration.

The proceedings were then ordered to be laid on the table.

Mr. Davis, pursuant to leave, introduced a bill to amend the act entitled "an act to amend the several acts imposing duties on imports;" which was read a first time.

Mr. Davis moved the second reading of the bill, and said it required a word of explanation. It would be remembered by all that the tariff of imports underwent an entire revision in 1832. It would be seen that, in passing such a law, it was not convenient to enumerate all articles of merchandise, as it would render an act too voluminous. Articles of merchandise were, therefore, as far as they conveniently could be, classed. In doing this, it brought goods of like character, and subject to like duties, together; but some kinds of merchandise were mixed in their character, being made of different materials, as of cotton and wool, silk and wool, or cotton and silk, and thus it became difficult sometimes to assign such articles to their proper class.

It had so proved in regard to lead, which, in its unmanufactured state, was subject to a heavy duty of three cents a pound, while in some of its manufactured states it was liable only to fifteen per cent. It was, therefore, immediately introduced in the form of busts, and then applied to any purposes for which lead was needed, being substantially, for all purposes, considered as unmanufactured. Yet the courts held that it was manufactured lead in this form of busts, and subject to a duty only of fifteen per cent. It became necessary to pass an explanatory act, to carry into effect the real purpose of the law, by giving suitable protection to the producers of lead, and busts are now on the footing of unmanufactured lead.

The bill now introduced is to meet a like unexpected construction of the law.

The bill was read a second time, and then, on motion of Mr. Davis, referred to the committee on manufactures.

The senate proceeded to consider the bill to appropriate, for a limited term, the proceeds of the public lands, &c.

Mr. Clay spoke at great length in support of the bill.

Mr. Clay concluded about 20 minutes before 4 o'clock, when, on motion of Mr. Linn, the senate adjourned.

April 27. The bill making appropriation for the naval service of the year, was taken up on the motion of Mr. Southard—Among other proceedings—

The bill being reported to the senate as amended.

Mr. Hill asked for the yeas and noes on the first amendment, which increases the appropriation for the pay of the navy from \$1,974,178 91 to \$2,544,338 16, and they were ordered.

The question was then taken on concurring in the amendment, and decided as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Clayton, Cuthbert, Davis, Ewing, of Ill. Goldsborough, Grundy, Hendricks, Hubbard, King, of Alabama, Knight, Leigh, Linn, McKean, Mangum, Morris, Nicholas, Niles, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Robbins, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Southard, Swift, Tipton, Tomlinson, Walker, Webster, White, Wright—37.

NAYS—Messrs. Ewing, of Ohio, Hill, King, of Geo. Moore, Naudain—5.

The other amendments were then concurred in.

Mr. Hill moved to reconsider the vote by which the amendment appropriating money for an exploring expedition was agreed to, but the motion was negatived.

The question being on the engrossment of the amendment, Mr. Hill asked the yeas and noes; which were ordered.

The question was then taken, and decided in the affirmative yeas 44, nays 1.

The special order, the bill to appropriate the proceeds of the public lands for a limited time, and to grant lands to certain states therein named, being called up.

Many motions to postpone, lay on the table for a time, &c. were made by Mr. Benton and others; on which the yeas and

nays were several times called, and generally decided about as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Cuthbert, Ewing, of Illinois, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King, of Alabama, King, of Georgia, Linn, Moore, Morris, Niles, Rives, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Walker, Wright—20.

NAYS—Messrs. Black, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing, of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Webster, White—26.

Among other proceedings—

Mr. Brown moved to strike out the first section of the bill.

Mr. Moore asked for the yeas and nays; which were ordered. [This section provides for the ten per centum to the new states.]

The question was then taken on the amendment, and decided as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Brown, Buchanan, Cuthbert, Hill, Hubbard,

King, of Geo. McKean, Mangum, Niles, Ruggles, Shepley—11. NAYS—Messrs. Benton, Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing, of Illinois, Ewing, of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, King, of Ala. Knight, Leigh, Linn, Moore, Morris, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Rives, Robbins, Robinson, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Walker, Webster, White—31.

At last—

At half past five o'clock, Mr. Ruggles moved that the senate adjourn—yeas 18, noes 26.

The question was then taken on the first proposition of Mr. Benton, and decided in the negative—yeas 18, nays 27.

The question was then taken on the second proposition "holding treaties with Indians, for the purchase of lands," and decided in the negative—yeas 18, nays 26.

The question was then taken on the next item, "amount paid to Indians for purchase of land," the vote was—yeas 18, nays 26.

The last item "amount expended for the removal of Indians from lands purchased," was negatived—yeas 17, nays 28.

The question on the third reading of the bill was ordered to be taken by yeas and nays, and being taken, was decided as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Black, Buchanan, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing, of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Naudain, Nicholas, Porter, Prentiss, Preston, Robbins, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Webster, White—25.

NAYS—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Calhoun, Cuthbert, Ewing, of Illinois, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King, of Ala. King, of Geo. Linn, Moore, Morris, Niles, Rives, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Walker, Wright—21.

So the bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time.

The senate then adjourned.

April 28. The resolution of Mr. Buchanan, instructing the committee on finance to inquire into the expediency of authorising the president of the United States to contract with L. Persico for furnishing two groups of statuary to complete the eastern front of the capitol, was taken up, and a debate ensued in which Messrs. Preston, Mangum, Calhoun, Buchanan, Clay, Davis and Clayton participated.

The resolution was passed.

The bill to appropriate, for a limited term, the proceeds of the public lands, and grant lands to certain states, was read a third time.

The question being on its passage,

Mr. Niles made some observations in opposition to the bill.

Mr. Benton moved to recommit the bill, with instructions to ascertain and report the proper charges for expenditures to be deducted from the avails of the public lands; which was decided in the negative, only fifteen voting in the affirmative.

On motion of Mr. Morris, that the senate adjourn, the yeas and nays being required, it was decided in the negative, as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Benton, Brown, Cuthbert, Ewing, of Illinois, Grundy, Hill, Hubbard, King, of Alabama, King, of Georgia, Linn, Morris, Nicholas, Niles, Rives, Robinson, Ruggles, Shepley, Tallmadge, Walker, Wright—20.

NAYS—Messrs. Black, Calhoun, Clay, Clayton, Crittenden, Davis, Ewing, of Ohio, Goldsborough, Hendricks, Kent, Knight, Leigh, McKean, Mangum, Moore, Naudain, Porter, Prentiss, Robbins, Southard, Swift, Tomlinson, Webster, White—24.

After some words in explanation, from Messrs. Porter, Benton and Morris, the senate adjourned.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

Friday, April 22. Mr. Jarvis, from the committee on naval affairs, submitted the following report:

That the committee on naval affairs, to which was referred the resolution of the mayor and city council of Baltimore in favor of the establishing of a navy yard at that city, with instructions to inquire into the expediency of making such an establishment, have had the subject under consideration, and report:

That there are already two navy yards established within the capes of the Chesapeake, viz: those of Washington and Norfolk, which are abundantly sufficient for all the purposes of the navy in this quarter, and the following resolution is, therefore, submitted:

Resolved, That it is inexpedient to establish a navy yard at Baltimore.

A good deal of minor business being attended to—

In pursuance of the special order of the 20th instant, the house went into committee of the whole on the state of the union, (Mr. Muhlenberg in the chair), and resumed the consideration of the "bill authorising the president of the United States to accept the services of volunteers in certain cases."

After a rather wide and desultory debate, and the appropriation of 300,000 dollars to the purpose—

Mr. Adams moved to amend the bill by adding a proviso that nothing therein contained shall be so construed as to deprive the persons so called into the service of the United States, of any privileges belonging to the militia, when called into the service of the government; which was agreed to.

Mr. Everett moved so to amend the bill as to leave it optional with the president to accept the services of the volunteers either for six or twelve months. Agreed to.

Mr. Whittlesey moved further to amend the bill by striking out the 4th section, which insures the volunteers against any loss of property in the service. Mr. W. opposed this section as introducing a new principle, and stated also that the subject was under consideration in the committee of claims, with a view to the formation of a general law on the subject. The motion was agreed to.

The bill was laid aside, and the committee then took up, and considered the "bill for the better protection of the western frontier."

On motion, the committee rose, and reported the "bill authorising the president of the United States to accept the services of volunteers in certain cases," with sundry amendments; and on the bill, last considered, obtained leave to sit again. The house then adjourned.

Saturday, April 23. Some time was spent on Mr. Dromgoole and Mr. Wise's motions concerning the deposit banks. Without any thing being decided, the order of the day was called, and the house proceeded to the consideration of many private bills.

Monday, April 25. The resolutions of Kentucky and Massachusetts, in favor of the passage of the land bill was taken up, and, afterwards, laid upon the table—and a large quantity of minor proceedings had.

On motion of Mr. Cambreleng, the bill making a further appropriation of one million of dollars for the suppression of the hostilities of the Seminole Indians in Florida was taken up.

Mr. Cambreleng stated that only \$487 remained of the former appropriations for this object.

The bill was, without question, laid aside to be reported, without amendment. [The bill was subsequently passed.]

On motion of Mr. Cambreleng, the committee took up for consideration the bill supplementary to the general civil and diplomatic appropriation bill providing for the salaries of certain officers therein named.

Some amendments being made to the bill, it was laid aside; and certain other appropriation bills proceeded with. Adjourned.

Tuesday, April 26. The morning business being attended to, certain appropriation bills were taken up, considered and amended, &c. And the house adjourned.

Wednesday, April 27. The following resolution, reported by Mr. Owens, from the committee of ways and means, was taken up:

Resolved, That the bill reported by the committee of ways and means, regulating the deposit of the money of the United States in certain local banks, be made the special order of the day for the first Wednesday in May next, at 12 o'clock, provided the appropriation bills be at that time disposed of; and in case said appropriation bills be not then acted on, then on the day next after their disposition; and that the said bill in relation to the deposit banks have precedence on the first Wednesday in May next, or the day after the disposition of the appropriation bills, and the following days, over all other business until the same is disposed of.

The resolution was amended by striking out the first Wednesday in May and inserting the second Wednesday.

A good deal of minor business being attended to—

On motion of Mr. Cambreleng, the house went into committee of the whole on the state of the union, (Mr. J. Y. Mason in the chair), in pursuance of the special order of the 26th of January.

The bill making appropriations for the support of the army for the year 1836 was taken up and read.

And, being some time considered—the house adjourned.

Thursday, April 28. After the usual morning business, the army appropriation bill was taken up and further considered, and some progress made therein.

The amendments were read, and ordered to be printed, and with the bill, were referred to the committee on naval affairs.

On motion of Mr. McKim, (offered by consent), 5,000 extra copies of the reports of the secretaries of war and navy, on the subject of national defence, were ordered to be printed. The house then adjourned.

LATEST FROM FLORIDA.

From the Savannah Georgian, of the 18th April.

The Santee, captain Brooks, arrived yesterday morning from Picolata, Black Creek, &c. via Jacksonville. We learn from

an officer of the army, a passenger in the Santee, that when the boat left the above places not the slightest intelligence had been received of the movements of general Scott and the forces under his command. A letter, dated 8th or 9th inst. had been received at Black Creek from captain Ledrum, commanding at Fort Drane, in which was enclosed a note received by express from captain Gates, the commandant at Fort King, stating that intelligence had been received from general Eustis, who with the left wing of the army reached Pifalkikaha, (about thirty miles from Tampa) without encountering on the march any of the enemy except a small party, which after an irregular fire dispersed, leaving two or three of their number killed, one of which was a chief (Eueche Billy).

This engagement is doubtless the same as that already noticed as having occurred at Volusia on the 23d ult. in which the loss of the whites was stated at three killed, and the Indians five (among them Billy Hicks or Eueche Billy).

General Eustis states that he has with him a large number of famishing horses.

Information has reached Black Creek that five hundred Creeks, under general Woodward, had passed through Tallahassee on their way to Tampa.

Several Indian tracks have been seen within the last ten days from two to ten miles this side of Mickanopy, which were those of small parties of Indians apparently driving cattle towards Orange Lake. It is the general opinion at Fort Drane, which post one of our informants left on the 6th inst. that the Indians had dispersed themselves into scattered parties, but this was mere conjecture. Eighty-five of the Louisiana volunteers were left sick at Fort Drane.

From the Jacksonville Courier, April 14.

Since our last, nothing of importance has been heard from any division of the army. By an arrival from Fort Drane, we learn that on the 1st instant an express reached there, from general Eustis, stating that he was destitute of corn and forage for his horses. He has about seven hundred mounted men in his division. Having no corn or forage at Fort Drane to send him, they must have suffered exceedingly. General Eustis was then about twenty-five miles from Fort Drane, and four or five days' march behind general Scott.

It has now been sixteen days since general Scott reached the Wythlacochee. Considerable anxiety is felt with regard to them. They cannot have met the Indians near the old fighting ground, as their guns would have been heard. There is little doubt, that general Scott has marched to Tampa Bay. It is possible, that the Indians, on seeing his force, deemed it best to give themselves up, and that he has gone to escort them to Tampa Bay. It is far more probable that the Indians have eluded him, and he has been compelled to go there for provisions. With so large a force, it is scarcely possible, that any other disaster should befall them, than a scarcity of provisions.

Gen. Gaines has subjected his conduct to severe criticisms on several accounts—and we shall probably have another war, as soon as that in Florida ceases. The *Alexandria Gazette* says—

General Gaines in his general order on quitting the army of Florida sneeringly spoke of general Scott, as "the officer charged with the diplomatic arrangements of the war department." General Jesup, in a published letter in reply to captain Hitchcock's statements relative to the supplies in Florida, declares that he must be excused from sharing either the responsibility assumed or the honor gained by general Gaines in his late campaign! Thus they go. Throughout this whole Florida war we have observed with regret evidences of jealousy and bad feeling on the part of the officers. The country ought to frown upon such proceedings.

We shall lay aside the papers—for "future reference."

Many of the United States troops in Florida are perishing by the climate, being afflicted with pleurisy and inflammations.

TEXAS.

—We give the "sum and substance" of the news—without feeling any sort of responsibility on account of it.

The southern papers bring further and disastrous advices from Texas. The contest, it will be seen, is becoming fierce and sanguinary, and on the part of the Mexicans is one of extermination. The statement published two or three days ago, relative to the junction of the Texian force under col. Fanning with the army of Houston, proves to be incorrect. In attempting to cut their way from Goliad through the Mexican army, they were overpowered, compelled to capitulate, and, according to the account before us, subsequently massacred.

From the New Orleans Bee, April 11.

The most distressing intelligence was received yesterday from this delightful (but at present unfortunate) country, by the arrival of the general De Kalb, from Brazoria, whence she sailed on the third instant.

On the 23d ult. colonel Fanning had sent out a scouting party of about 50 men, they were massacred. On the 24th, he sent out a skirmishing party of 150; they were also cut off. He then resolved to destroy the fort of Goliad, burn the town, and cut his way through the enemy encamped in his neighborhood, as his provisions failed, and his garrison had diminished to 300. But in attempting this, he was surrounded by the Mexicans, and compelled to capitulate and lay down his arms—after which, with characteristic treachery, he and all were shot.

The detachment of volunteers from Georgia under major Ward, has been also cut off, with the exception of three persons, one of whom had arrived in Brazoria before the De Kalb sailed.

On the 26th ult. general Houston found it necessary or convenient to retreat twenty miles rearward from the Colorado river, as one wing of the Mexican army had arrived on the opposite bank. The Mexicans were advancing in two columns—one upon general Houston, the other towards the mouth of the Brazos.

The army under Houston was posted rear of the Brazos river on the 29th ult. and contained about 2,000 men; that column of the Mexicans opposed to him had then crossed the Colorado, and numbered about 3,000. The Texans think and Houston has determined that the enemy shall never recross the Colorado and we think and trust that they shall not pass the Brazos.

The Texans have actually become desperate from the massacres, and situation of their affairs. They have burned San Felipe de Austin; and destroyed all the country in their retreat. They have sent hither their women and children, with whom the De Kalb and other vessels are crowded. They have resolved in case of necessity to burn Brazoria and Bell's landing on the approach of the Mexicans; and are transporting most of their effects to Galveston; for which place the schooners Columbus and Flash were ready to sail. The Pennsylvania and Shenandoah were bound for this port; the Santiago was at the mouth of the river; and the Julius Cæsar within.

Extract of a letter dated, Peach Point, March 28.

Mr. Sharp has arrived from Houston's camp—he left there on the 24th in the evening—states that there were 800 Mexicans encamped just above the prairie, and Sharp thinks there has been an engagement. Houston had resolved to attack them; and so sanguine was he of success, that he was about to take measure, when Sharp left, to prevent their escaping by sending a body of 300 men beyond the enemy. Prisoners taken by our men state that the enemy's force did not exceed 5,000 men after leaving Bexar. Houston had with him about 2,000, and his force was daily augmenting. Nothing certain had been heard from Fanning; the reports are that he is retreating; the garrison at San Patricio, of 95 men, had had an engagement with the enemy, killed 159, and wounded as many more, and retreated without loss.

Yours, &c.

J. F. PERRY.

Extracts from the Texas Republican of the 23d March, Caney, March 22, 1836.

To the committee of Brazoria.

I have just arrived from Cox's Point, left about 30 armed men and some 25 unarmed, in charge of the public stores in that place, but fear from the general panic, that that place would be deserted, after bringing off as much as the lighters could bring, but if colonel Wharton had arrived with the force, said to be with him, the point could have been protected against ten times the number. I repaired east, in order to rally all the disposable force of the retreating families, but found every man shifting for himself and helpless family, all of which were crossing the Colorado, and on their way east; and this morning captain Sharp brings the news from the advance of Fanning's army, (who made their escape), that Fanning was surrounded and fighting in the prairie, six miles east of Goliad, for life, when the advance guard made their retreat, which was under the command of col. Horton, and I fear Fanning and his brave companions are slaughtered. The news is that all Americans in Gaudaloupe were butchered by the citizens, Spaniards. Such is our situation, and all will be on their way to-morrow further east, and unless you can rally and send on men forthwith, to the cover of the retreat, all must be lost; and I would recommend the procuring and detention of any vessel that may be in reach, to take off helpless families. And every man who can possibly do so, to rally and turn the enemy back faster than they came. I have the honor to subscribe myself,

Very respectfully,

BENJ. J. WHITE.

Mobile, April 11.

From Matagorda. The brig Tensaw, capt. Averill, arrived last evening from Matagorda in 8 days. Capt. Averill mainly confirms the melancholy intelligence copied from the Register of last evening. She brings fifty passengers, mostly woman and children, who have fled. It was reported that but four men were left in Matagorda, who were provided with boats to quit the place (after having blown it up). The Tensaw saw a Mexican cruiser twelve hours after she left Matagorda.

[Register.

New Orleans, April 11.

We have the following reports by the gen. De Kalb, from Brazoria, that sailed on the 3d instant. General Houston had retreated twenty miles from the Colorado on the 26th of March, the enemy having advanced to the opposite shore. San Felipe had been burnt by the inhabitants. Intelligence had been received at the mouth of the river, that col. Fanning had capitulated on condition not again to serve against the Mexicans, but that the next morning the whole garrison was put to the sword. No official information, however, had been received, and it was not generally believed. The Mexicans were advancing in two columns, one upon Houston, the other upon the mouth of the Brazos. The De Kalb is full of women and

children, and also many other vessels. The inhabitants are destroying every thing, and laying waste the country, lest it should fall into Mexican hands.

From the Memphis Enquirer.

The bodies of col. Travis and his little band were burned by order of Santa Anna. The lady of licut. Dickinson was within the fort and begged to share the honorable fate of her husband. Santa Anna here proved himself a soldier, and protected her; he replied, "I am not warring against women." He sent her away with the servant who carried this news, and who left her safely near Washington.

Fellow citizens of Texas generally: "news of the most disastrous nature, arrived here from the southern divisions of our army by the lieutenant and twenty men who formed the advance of Fanning's army; while trying to make their retreat from Fort Defiance, they were attacked by 2,700 Mexicans in the Big Prairie. They are now advancing towards the Colorado. Help we want—and that speedily. Time don't admit of my saying any thing more." FRANCIS WELLS.

From the New Orleans True American of April 13.

We received yesterday further accounts from Texas, but nothing upon which we can rely with certainty. It appears to us that the people of this country, either designedly or by accident, are kept very much in doubt as to the movements of the hostile armies of that country. Scarcely an account arrives but that is modified or contradicted by a subsequent arrival.

One thing is very positive—the Texans are now placed in a most critical—nay, a desperate situation. They have changed the first aspect of the war, from a people contending for their constitutional rights, which might have been secured to them, to a war waged for absolute independence. To say the least of such a step, it was impolitic, and quite too premature. Their population is too sparse to contend against Mexico—they lack men, money and resources, even with all the aid they have or may obtain from individuals or communities in this country, to hope for final success, or even to contend for any considerable length of time. Their only salvation now depends upon the interference of our government, and the question is, will it, ought it to interfere. We, for one, would be willing that it should.

But we fear that it will not; for the immediate interests of the country are opposed to such a step—more particularly at the present time, when there is evidently a want of unanimity among the Texans themselves, and every one, at least every leading man, appears to be acting upon his own responsibility.

There has been too much division in Texas—too much indirection; too much dividing of their small army into small detachments, left to be sacrificed by treble—nay, five times their number of the enemy.

It is stated in the New Orleans Post, that general Gaines has received orders from our government to preserve a strict neutrality in the contest going on between the residents of Texas and the Mexican government; and that armed emigrants from the United States, going for the purpose of interfering in this war, will not be permitted to enter Texas.

Women and children from Texas continue to arrive at New Orleans—most of them in great distress.

We have just received, (says a New York paper), the copy of a letter from Brazoria, under date of 24th March, which speaks of "all the settlements situated between the river Nueces and Los Brazos, (San Felipe de Austin included), as overrun by the Mexican troops, who give no quarter to those taken with arms in their hands."

It also communicates the copy of an important decree of Santa Anna emancipating all slaves carried into Texas in violation of the laws of Mexico. We will publish the whole to-morrow. Meantime, it should be added that the accounts from that country evince a pretty hopeless state of affairs for the insurgents.

It is stated in some of the letters received at New Orleans that among the Americans recently killed in the Texian war was Dr. Harrison, son of gen. Wm. H. Harrison, of Ohio.

Officers of the government of Texas.

David G. Burnet—president of the republic of Texas.

Lorenza D. Zavalla—vice president.

*Samuel P. Carson—secretary of state.

Thomas I. Rush, war.

Bailey Hardman, treasury.

*Robert Potter, navy.

David Thomas—attorney general.

J. R. Jones—postmaster general.

SOMETHING ABOUT EXPUNGING.

Correspondence of the Baltimore Patriot.

Washington, March 1, 1836.

A few words upon the doctrine of "expunging" legislative acts. It has been beautifully said that "history is the teaching of truth by example." Our own national history is full of such teaching; and I beg the attention of the reader to that passage of it which it is one of the objects of this letter to recite, and to comment upon, as a peculiarly appropriate lesson for the present times.

*Both were recently members of congress from N. Carolina.

In the year 1768, the house of representatives of "the province of Massachusetts Bay," addressed a circular letter to the speakers of assembly in the several colonies, upon the subject of certain acts of parliament then recently passed, imposing duties and taxes on the American provinces. This paper, like all the rest of that character and of that time, was drawn up by James Otis, of Massachusetts, of whom his biographer says, that his "great learning, quickness, keen perception, bold and powerful reasoning, made him the powerful source of almost every measure," and in relation to whom the elder Adams has said, "I have no hesitation or scruple to say that the commencement of the reign of George the third was the commencement of another Stuart's reign; and if it had not been checked by James Otis and others, first, and by the great Chatham afterwards, it would have been as arbitrary. I will not say that it would have extinguished civil and religious liberty on earth, but it would have gone great lengths towards it."

This "circular letter" contained respectful but strong animadversions upon the tyrannical and oppressive conduct of Great Britain towards the colonies; and soon after, the governor, (Bernard), of Massachusetts, transmitted to the house of representatives, a requisition of the premier, (lord Hillsborough), "that the house should rescind their circular letter!" and the penalty for refusing was to be the immediate dissolution of that body.

What was the course pursued by that house? Did they succumb to the requisition of power? Did those exemplars of liberty, those first teachers of the rudiments of free principles, leave on record a sanction to this doctrine of expunging legislative journals, and rescinding legislative documents? Far from it! They remonstrated against the requisition of the government, pointed out its absurdity, and boldly, yet in respectful terms, informed the governor that they could not comply with the demand. They said: "IT IS TO US ALTOGETHER INCOMPREHENSIBLE THAT WE SHOULD BE REQUIRED, on peril of a dissolution of the great and general court or assembly of this province, to rescind a resolution of a former house of representatives, when it is evident that resolution has no existence but as a mere historical fact." They went on to remind the government that "the resolution referred to was not then 'executory' but to all intents and purposes 'executed.'" The letters had been sent, published and answered; they were in the hands of the people, and they added—"We could as well rescind those letters as the resolutions, and both would be equally fruitless, if, by rescinding, it meant a repeal and nullifying of the resolution referred to." After much more able reasoning on this point, they conclude as follows: and I conjure the modern advocates of what in our fathers' time was thus considered HERETORY DOCTRINE, to "read, mark, learn and inwardly to digest" the passage. It is pregnant with salutary teaching.

"We have now only to inform your excellency that this house have voted not to rescind, as required, the resolution; and that, upon a division on the question, there were ninety-two nays, and seventeen yeas. Other members afterwards sent in their adhesion to the majority, making their numbers in all more than five to one! In all this we have been actuated by a conscientious, and finally by a clear and determined sense of duty to God, to our king, our country and OUR LATEST POSTERITY."

William Tudor, esq. the biographer of James Otis, (from whose work I have drawn many of these facts), remarks, that "this decision of the house was received throughout the province, and in ALL THE COLONIES, WITH ENTHUSIASM. The number 'ninety-two' became a favorite toast, and was the subject of frequent allusion." The same able writer goes on to remark, "the proposition that the house should rescind the 'executed' transactions of another had something ludicrous in its very terms."

Such is a page from our own national history, expressing the opinions, sentiments and principles of the fathers of the country: of men who breathed the pure spirit of freedom and independence into the people of their day, and who declared that they acted under "a conscientious sense of their duty to God, their country, and their latest posterity."

Are the children wiser than their fathers? Are we "wiser in our generation, than the children of light?"

CONGRESSMEN—IN OFFICE!

The following abstract is from an official document lately laid before congress.

Martin Van Buren, for less than three years service as secretary of state and minister to England	\$31,846 66
Samuel D. Ingham, as secretary of the treasury, less than three years	14,268 50
John H. Eaton, as secretary of war and governor of Florida about two years and a half	18,933 33
John M. Berrien, attorney general	8,479 10
John Branch, secretary of the navy	13,575 63
Thomas P. Moore, minister of Colombia, about four years	51,646 80
Louis McLane, minister to England, secretary of the treasury and of state about four years and a half	50,381 57

William C. Rives, minister to France, about three years	45,749 53
John Forsyth, secretary of state one year and a half	9,000 00
Selah R. Hobbie, assistant postmaster general	15,625 00
Levi Woodbury, secretary of the treasury and of the navy about four years and a half	27,642 85
Edward Livingston, minister to France and secretary of state, a little more than four years	46,798 38
James Buchanan, minister to Russia about one year and a half	27,044 30
William Wilkins, minister to Russia	16,789 94
Edward Kavanah, charge d'affaires to Portugal, not gone yet	2,288 00
Powhattan Ellis, charge d'affaires to Mexico, and judge for the district of Mississippi	6,929 35
Philip P. Barbour, judge east district of Virginia	9,415 76
Thomas Erwin, judge west district of Pennsylvania	8,485 00
James W. Ripley, collector at Passamaquoddy to 31st December, 1834	12,750 00
John Chandler, collector at Portland, to 31st December, 1834	18,323 25
George W. Owen, collector at Mobile, to 31st December, 1834	17,250 21
John Biddle, register of the land office, Detroit, to 31st December, 1834	12,997 45

Aggregate \$488,679 30

In addition to the above, three other members of congress have received appointments, whose accounts are not in the register's office, viz: Nicholas D. Coleman, postmaster at Maysville, Ky.—J. M. Wayne, to be judge of the supreme court, and Andrew Stevenson to be minister to England.

[There are, we think, several additional names to be added—and, certainly several additional sums.]

TREASURY OF VIRGINIA.

State of the public funds, on the morning of the 1836.	of April,
Balance per treasury office books:	
In the bank of Virginia	\$195,621 34
" Farmers' bank of Virginia	206,432 48
	\$402,053 82
Balance in the bank of Virginia, per account rendered	\$195,644 17
In the Farmers' bank of Virginia, per account rendered	207,643 21
	403,287 38
Deduct account of checks issued by the treasurer, on warrants drawn by the auditor of public accounts, and not presented for payment before the 1st of April	\$1,210 61
Deduct also amount of orders paid into bank previous to the 1st April, the certificates for which were not returned to the treasury office	22 83
Gain to the literary fund, prior to April, 1829,	12
	\$1,233 56
	\$402,053 82
In the bank of Virginia, on the 1st April, 1836	\$195,621 34
In the Farmers' bank of Virginia	206,432 48
	\$402,053 82
To the credit of the commonwealth	145,552 07
Literary fund	89,071 06
James River company	6,696 54
Board of public works	78,737 17
N. V. turnpike road	31,992 13
Com's sinking fund	50,000 00
Gain in change prior to April, 1829	4 85
	\$402,053 82

L. BURFOOT, treasurer commonwealth.

EXPEDITION TO THE SOUTH POLAR SEAS.

We were glad to observe in the official paper a few days ago, a commendatory notice of the proposed exploring expedition to the South Polar seas, as we infer from the article a disposition in the executive favorable to the object. The considerations which recommend it to the adoption of the government, connected as well with national pride as with a great branch of the national wealth, are too numerous to be entered into in a brief paragraph; they are fully set forth in the able report

made by Mr. SOUTHARD, from the naval committee of the senate, which we shall endeavor at a future day to give at large. At present our space compels us to content ourselves with the annexed extract from the article of the *Globe*, to which we add, from the numerous documents reported by the committee, a letter from commodore DOWNS, an officer whose general intelligence and great experience in the navigation of the South seas, entitle his opinion to peculiar weight on this subject:

[*Nat. Intelligencer.*

From the Globe.

Expedition to the South seas and Pacific ocean. We have been waiting several days to find space in our columns to say a word in reference to the above enterprise.

The practical views contained in the report of the committee on naval affairs, recently made in the senate, as well as the address of Mr. Reynolds, delivered a few evenings since, in the hall of representatives, has left a very favorable impression, and there seems now to be but little doubt that the expedition will be authorised.

What is the amount of our interests in the seas where the principal labors of the expedition will be performed?

To say nothing of the vessels engaged in the various traffic among the islands in the Pacific, the following will show what interests we have in the various branches of the whale fishery from different ports in the United States:

Ports.	Vessels.	Ports.	Vessels.
New Bedford.....	154	Bristol.....	17
Nantucket.....	71	New London.....	29
Lynn.....	5	Norwich.....	1
Gloucester.....	1	New York.....	6
Portsmouth.....	4	Newburg.....	3
Warren.....	15	Wilmington, Del.....	3
Providence.....	2	Dartmouth.....	4
Mystic.....	3	Wareham.....	1
Green Port.....	3	Edgarton.....	8
Hudson.....	11	Plymouth.....	4
Newark, N. J.....	1	Salem.....	9
Westport.....	3	Provincetown.....	1
Fairhaven.....	31	Wisasset.....	1
Rochester.....	4	Newport.....	9
Falmouth.....	4	Stonington.....	3
Fall River.....	3	Sag Harbor.....	24
Dorchester.....	4	Poughkeepsie.....	4
Newburyport.....	4	Bridgeport.....	2
Portland.....	1		

This immense fleet of 460 sail will average about 375 tons each—making one hundred and seventy-two thousand five hundred tons, or one-tenth the tonnage of the United States.

The cost of these vessels is from twenty to sixty thousand dollars each, on an average of say forty thousand dollars—which requires an active capital of *eighteen million four hundred thousand dollars!*

The importance of this trade to the vast interior, even extending to the "far west" and south, is not so generally understood as it should be. A single statement will set this matter in a proper point of view.

Every time this whale fleet puts to sea, there is required in outfits—

Flour 80,040 barrels; pork and beef, 79,120 barrels; molasses, 621,000 gallons; coffee, 552,600 lbs.; sugar, 256,800 lbs.; tea, 172,500 lbs.; rice, 1,300 tierces; duck, 46,450 pieces; cordage, 8,960 tons; iron hoops, 4,600 tons; copper, 552,000 sheets—vessels coppered every voyage; staves, 10,000,000.

Whaling gear, \$1,000 cost to each vessel—consisting of harpoons, spades, cambooses, &c. &c.

Besides all these, large quantities of beans, corn, peas, potatoes, &c. are required in outfits.

COMMODORE DOWNS' LETTER.

[*Charlestown, (Mass.) Jan. 21, 1835.*

"DEAR SIR: In compliance with your request that I would communicate to you, in writing, my views on the subject of a voyage of discovery to the South seas and Pacific ocean, I have to regret that the circumscribed limits of a letter will allow but little more than the simple expression of an opinion on a subject of so much national importance, and in relation to which so much might be said in detail.

"I have had some experience in the navigation of the less frequented parts of the Pacific at an earlier period of my life. During my late voyage in the *Potomac*, I have had an opportunity to add greatly to the knowledge acquired in former years. An expedition fitted out for the purpose of improving our knowledge of the hydrography of those seas, has often been the subject of my reflections. As the representative of a district largely engaged in the whale fishery, you must frequently have seen, from the reports of masters of vessels engaged in that business, accounts of new islands and reefs being frequently discovered, and which are either not laid down on the charts, or so erroneously marked that they can give no security to the mariner. It is probable that not less than five hundred of these islands and reefs have been marked with sufficient accuracy by our whalers, sealers and traffickers, of one kind or another, to enable an expedition to examine the most important of them, without much loss of time in seeking their positions. This will enable the discovery vessels to do more, in less time, than has probably ever been effected by a similar enterprise from any other country. Of the extent of our interest in those remote seas, I need not speak, as you are conversant

with the subject; besides, the interest has been fairly represented by memorials to congress. During the circumnavigation of the globe, in which I crossed the equator six times, and varied my course from 40 deg. north to 57 deg. south latitude, I have never found myself beyond the limits of our commercial marine. The accounts given of the dangers and losses to which our shipping are exposed by the extension of our trade into seas but little known, so far, in my opinion, from being exaggerated, would admit of being placed in bolder relief, and the protection of government implored in stronger terms. I speak from practical knowledge, having myself seen the dangers, and painfully felt the want of the very kind of information in the guidance of a vessel in those seas which our commercial interests so much need, and which, I suppose, would be the object of such an expedition as is now under consideration before the committee of congress to give. Indeed, the whole of this business, it seems to me, is a plain and practical affair. The commerce of our country has extended itself to remote parts of the world, is carried on around islands and reefs not laid down on the charts, among even groups of islands from ten to sixty in number, abounding in objects valuable in commerce, but of which nothing is known accurately; no, not even the sketch of a harbor has been made, while of such as are inhabited our knowledge is still more imperfect. It would seem to require no argument to prove that a portion of our commerce might be rendered more secure, and probably greatly increased, by vessels sent, properly prepared, to examine such islands. There are also immense portions of the South seas, bordering on the antarctic circle, well deserving the attention of such an expedition, especially during the most favorable months of the southern summer. Islands discovered in that quarter will probably be found to yield rich returns in animal fur. Indeed, discoveries of this kind have recently been made by some English whalers, supposed to be of great extent, the vessels having sailed along three hundred miles of coast lying south of the Cape of Good Hope. This may lead to other very interesting discoveries, which will probably be found, on further examination, to be a continuation of Palmer's Land, lying south of the South Shetland islands, or only separated from it by a narrow channel. Much might be said in favor of a speedy examination of this portion of the South seas; indeed, I hardly know where an expedition could go where it might not be in the way of doing good, to say nothing of the credit our country would acquire in promoting such an enterprise.

"As to my opinion of the class of vessels best suited for such an expedition, I should unhesitatingly say, two brigs or barques, of two hundred tons each, and a tender, of from eighty to one hundred tons. A great many weighty reasons might be given to show that if, in the same ratio, vessels were beyond this size, the chances of safety and extensive usefulness would be proportionately decreased. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JOHN DOWNS.

"Hon. John Reed, member of congress."

ACCOUNT OF THE PUBLIC MONEY.

Report of the secretary of the treasury, in compliance with a resolution of the senate.

Treasury department, April 18, 1836.

SIR: The present communication is submitted in compliance with a resolution of the senate passed on the 13th instant, in the following words:

"Resolved, That the secretary of the treasury be directed to report to the senate, with as little delay as may be practicable, the amount of money in the treasury on the first of this month, where deposited, and the amount of the liabilities of the several banks of deposit, respectively, with their means of meeting the same; and, also the receipts of the treasury for the quarter ending the 31st of March last, arranged under the heads of customs, public lands and incidental receipts."

Inferring, from the introductory language used in the resolution, that an early reply was very desirable, measures were immediately taken to prepare the statements requested, so far as the necessary returns have been received at this department.—Although they are not yet complete from a few distant places, yet it is believed the results will not be very materially altered by the residue of them.

1. In reply to the first inquiry by the senate, I would observe that the amount of money in the treasury, subject to draft on the 1st of April, 1836, so far as ascertained in the running account kept by the treasurer for his information, is believed to be correctly stated in his communication annexed, at the sum of \$31,895,155 76. (A).

It may be proper to add, in explanation, that this is the amount, without any deduction, for outstanding existing appropriations; that, during the two previous years, the receipts from both customs and lands have been somewhat larger in the first than the second quarter of each year, but, in A. D. 1835, fluctuated so as, in the last two quarters, to increase nearly one hundred per cent; and that the expenditures, during the first quarter of the present year, have been so small as to draw somewhat less money from the treasury than during the first quarters of those years.

2. In reply to the next inquiry, as to the places where this money was then deposited, the schedule annexed also exhibits the amount to the credit of the treasurer on that day in each bank employed as a depository of the public money. (A).

The difference between the amounts in different banks and states arises from the fact that the sums were placed in those

banks on mere fiscal principles and for fiscal purposes alone, being money either collected nearest to them, or sent to them for future disbursements or for safe keeping, at the convenient points for public use, in the manner and under the circumstances explained more fully in my last report to congress.

This department, without special authority from congress, and which authority that body has not yet thought proper to confer, has never felt empowered to divide equally among the states or its banks, for loaning out with or without interest, or for any other than fiscal purposes, any of the money now intrusted to its temporary charge for fiscal purposes alone.

3. In relation to the inquiry concerning the amount of the liabilities of the several banks of deposits, respectively, with their means of meeting the same, a document is annexed, the latest completed on this subject, which gives in detail, according to the returns nearest to the 1st of March, the amount of liabilities, immediate and otherwise, of each bank, and the means of that bank, whether immediate or otherwise, to discharge its liabilities. (B). In explanation, an aggregate statement is given at the bottom of the document, which shows the immediate liabilities of all these banks, at that time, to be about \$93,000,069 96, and the immediate means of all, to discharge those liabilities, to be about \$38,082,699 93; such means being in the ratio of about one to two and a half of those liabilities.—It shows further, that their whole liabilities, other than to their stockholders for capital, are about \$103,762,279 80, and their whole means of every kind to discharge them, are about \$146,056,210 07, or one of means to less than three-fourths of those liabilities. In further explanation, I would observe that, among their means, are included, under the head of "other investments," the sum of about \$12,427,759 97. That is so described in the table annexed, for the purpose and convenience of condensing numerous small items which, in most cases, are set out by the banks with particularity and fullness. As suggested, partly in a note, they consist chiefly of stocks, bonds, mortgages, bills and checks in transitu, capitals furnished to branches, &c. and presumed to be, generally, secure and proper investments.

It may be properly added, in connexion with this exhibit, that the security of the treasury, in relation to the deposits in those banks; depends not only on their large means, compared with their liabilities to the government and others, except their stockholders, but on the collateral security which, as stated in my last annual report, has been given to the treasury, in most cases where the deposits are large compared with the capital of the bank.

The returns of all the banks to the 31st of March have not yet been received and arranged; but, as soon as they are, the results will be submitted. So far as examined, it is believed that the proportions on the above subject, of liabilities and means, will not be materially varied.

4. The fourth and last inquiry is as to the receipts into the treasury for the quarter ending the 31st of March last, arranged under the heads of customs, public lands and incidental receipts. These, so far as ascertained, are from customs \$5,006,050; from lands \$5,430,650; and from miscellaneous sources \$280,000.—As previously intimated, the receipts from customs and lands have of late years, if not formerly, been considerably larger in the first than in the second quarter of that year, though last year so extraordinary a fluctuation happened that the receipts from lands more than doubled in the last two quarters. Contrary to the expectation of the department last November, the receipts from the same source have continued to be unprecedentedly great. This has occurred, also, notwithstanding the quantity of new lands put up for sale, in behalf of the government, at public auction, in the last quarter, has been very small and the probable falling off in the receipts from this source in March, compared with those in February, has been about one-third. Whether this falling off, or an approximation to it, more or less, is likely to continue during the residue of the year, this department, in the great fluctuations of business and speculation which have characterized the last six months, has not had, and cannot have, any means of judging with much certainty. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEVI WOODBURY,
secretary of the treasury.

Hon. Martin Van Buren, vice president of the U. States,
and president of the senate.

[The following is a table A referred to in the above report, the table B being only a particular statement of the condition of the deposit banks, not materially differing from the large tabular statement published some time ago.]

Statement of the amount of moneys in the treasury that is subject to draft on the 31st of March, 1836, so far as ascertained from the returns received, (and exclusive of unavailable funds), with the several places of deposit.

In what institution.	Amount.
Main bank, Portland.....	\$178,884 22
Commercial bank, Portsmouth.....	127,813 33
Merchants' bank, Boston.....	838,684 05
Commonwealth bank, Boston.....	1,009,731 52
Bank of Burlington, Vermont.....	52,893 48
Farmers and Mechanics' bank, Hartford.....	66,330 89
Mechanics' bank, New Haven.....	41,315 06
Arcade bank, Providence.....	113,982 08
Mechanics and Farmers' bank, Albany, N. York..	216,659 62
Manhattan company, New York.....	3,512,791 44

Bank of America, New York.....	3,708,714 20
Mechanics' bank, city of New York.....	3,816,261 80
Girard bank, Philadelphia.....	2,540,910 64
Moyamensing bank, Philadelphia.....	510,052 25
Union bank of Maryland, Baltimore.....	906,424 91
Franklin bank, Baltimore.....	344,388 74
Bank of the Metropolis, Washington.....	181,486 90
Bank of Virginia, Richmond.....	108,511 26
Branch of bank of Virginia, Petersburg.....	14,564 76
Branch of bank of Virginia, Norfolk.....	127,633 55
Bank of North Carolina, Raleigh.....	83,682 07
Planters and Mechanics' bank, Charleston.....	287,968 42
Planters' bank of Georgia, Savannah.....	195,812 48
Bank of Augusta, Georgia.....	177,870 89
Branch bank of Alabama, Mobile.....	1,694,464 16
Union bank of Louisiana, New Orleans.....	1,143,652 35
Commercial bank, New Orleans.....	1,177,634 50
Merchants and Manufacturers' bank, Pittsburgh..	51,095 72
Clinton bank, Columbus, Ohio.....	394,077 52
Franklin bank, Cincinnati.....	191,543 72
Commercial bank, Cincinnati.....	395,135 13
Agency of do. at Louis.....	1,471,157 75
Louisville Savings institution.....	474,592 83
Branch bank of Indiana, Indianapolis.....	868,672 30
Do. do. New Albany.....	352,645 75
Do. do. Richmond.....	168,918 24
Union bank of Tennessee, Nashville.....	34,916 61
Planters' bank of Mississippi, Natchez.....	2,649,586 24
Bank of Michigan, Detroit.....	960,364 35
Farmers and Mechanics' bank, Detroit.....	702,380 03

\$31,805,155 76

In addition to the above amount, there is, at the credit of the treasurer, in the Union bank of Tennessee, received, on account of sales of Chickasaw lands, the sum of 446,000 dollars; which is to be invested for the benefit of the Chickasaw Indians, agreeably to the stipulations of the treaty.

Treasury of the United States, April 15, 1836.

JOHN CAMPBELL, treasurer.

Hon. Levi Woodbury, secretary of the treasury.

REPORT FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

The following is the report of the secretary of war, transmitted to the senate by the president of the United States on the 8th instant, in compliance with resolutions adopted by that body on the 18th February, requesting information of the probable amount of appropriations that would be necessary to place the land and naval defences of the country upon a proper footing of strength and respectability.

Department of war, April 7, 1836.

Sir: In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit reports from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of the information as required by the resolution of the senate of February 18, 1836, as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munitions of war. The former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report has therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy.

The engineer report was received at the department on Friday last, and I have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and a slight indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did not consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at this advanced stage of the session, while, at the same time, I am aware that this letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it.

It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system of national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional experience and a knowledge of practical details: such information, in fact, as must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur in all the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still, I have thought it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar views of my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community; and if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen, and suggest preparations which future exigencies will not probably require, they are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the action of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in particular, evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same time, its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able document.

Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of defence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in conformity with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself.

I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland border rests, in the south west and north east upon the possessions of civilized nations, and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only, which, in the pre-

sent state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the existing intercourse of nations, hostilities can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not to leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers, threatened with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of these lines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or whose possession would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. In fact, the division is, in both cases, an artificial line, through much of its extent, and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military operations. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to construct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the space under cover of their guns; which are not required as places of depot; which guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surrounding country penetrable in all directions. Without indulging in any improper speculations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in juxtaposition with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may safely anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at least equal to that of the people who adjoin us; nor does the most prudent forecast dictate any precautions, founded upon the opinion that our relative strength will decrease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar considerations; and I think the views submitted by the engineer department, respecting Lake Champlain, are entitled to much weight. This long narrow sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the states of New York and Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and is commanded by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powerful and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources and energies. With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to probable events, it may be deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site within our boundary, which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels descending its outlet. As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from circumstances, peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proportion to its exposure.

There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes, Ontario, Erie, Huron and Michigan, which are open to the enterprise of our citizens; and this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores of these lakes. The resolution of the senate embraces the inquiry into the expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this inquiry properly divides itself into two branches:

1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors upon the lakes; and
2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications between them.

Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon these waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of any circumstances which would give this ascendancy to the other party. It is unnecessary to investigate the considerations which bear upon this subject, as they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications, they would only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no defences we could construct would secure us against invasion; and temporary block houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them.

As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry from geographical causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huron, and to the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consists of two rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into one of these, the river St. Clair, is impeded by a bar, over which there is but about eight feet of water. No armed vessel could force their way up these rivers while the shores were in an enemy's possession, who might construct batteries at every projecting point, and who, in fact, might in many places sweep the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too broad to be commanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the north eastern extremity of Lake Huron.

I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences, and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the *personnel* and *materiel*, which the extent and other advantages our country insure to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter.

It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a *depot* for the reception of munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen it by such defences as will enable it to resist any *coup de main* which may be attempted. From the geographical features of the country, our possessions here recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact with a fertile and popu-

lous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of disturbances, the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any enterprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain possession of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively unimportant, even should the contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify precautionary measures.

I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the committee on military affairs of the senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which was sent to the chairman of the committee on military affairs of the house of representatives, to suggest the mode best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the establishment of a road from some point upon the Upper Mississippi to Red river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not to be departed from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding, not a stationary one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upon their exterior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indigenous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, that no works of a more permanent character than these should be constructed upon our frontier. A cordon established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of operation deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them, would, probably, afford greater security to the advanced settlements than any other measures in our power. The dragoons should be kept in motion along it during the open season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend powerfully to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians; and if any sudden impulse should operate or drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a strong force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand. And as circumstances permit, the posts in the Indian country, now in the rear of this proposed line of operations, should be abandoned, and the garrisons transferred to it.

But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coast for three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us from those nations who have made the highest advances in all the arts, and particularly in those which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from our intercourse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into collision. If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of separation and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile demonstrations, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, and which, to be successfully resisted, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. These advantages depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the celerity of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole shore spread out before him, and to select his point of attack at pleasure. A powerful hostile fleet upon the coast of the United States presents some of the features of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which may be cut up in detail, although their combined force would exceed the assailing foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant that it would be impracticable to keep, at each of them, a force competent to resist the attack of an enemy, prepared, by his naval ascendancy and his other arrangements, to make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and averted.

The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper method of defence, is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent proportioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the actual construction and equipment of vessels only; the number of those in service must depend on the state of the country at a given period; but I mean the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth of a navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government; so that, on the approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea, without delay, sufficiently powerful to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast.

Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we shall find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derangement of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result of a war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government, and is a sure guaranty that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in one, unless imperiously required by those considerations which leave no alternative between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that we are more disposed to bear

while evils ought to be borne, than to seek redress by appeals to arms; still, however, a contest must come, and it behooves us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attendant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences.

It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment. That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper department; but as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily led to submit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and employment of our military marine.

There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical capacity to maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and seamen of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and created by those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, removes all doubt upon one point: and the history of our naval enterprise, from the moment when the colors were first hoisted upon the hastily prepared vessels, at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle, to the last contest in which any of our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the other. The achievements of our navy have stamped its character with the country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulogium which can be pronounced upon it.

With ample means, therefore, to meet upon the ocean, by which they must approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called upon by every prudential consideration to do so. In the first place, though all wars in which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, undertaken to resent or repel some injury or to assert some right, and rendered necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be best attained by its vigorous prosecution. Defensive in its causes, it should be offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent, the sooner and more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal belligerent measures should have for their aim to attack our antagonist where he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the vantage ground; and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice, by inviting his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the ocean only can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean only can we seriously assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision.

But, independently of the policy of making an adversary feel the calamities of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could effect a landing at numerous points upon our shores, even if the best devised plan of fortifying them were consummated. And, from the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point. These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detached to our seas. Our coast would thus be defended on the ocean, and the calamities of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would permit.

As to the other advantages of a navy, in the protection of commerce, they do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not therefore adverted to. Nor is it necessary or indeed proper that I should present those considerations of distance, of exposure and of station, which would render a fleet numerically inferior, in the aggregate, to that of the enemy, yet still sufficiently powerful, upon our own coasts, to meet and overcome any armament which could probably be sent here.

It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the navy. Nor do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except those imposed by a due regard to the public revenues, from time to time, and by the probable condition of other maritime nations. Much of the *matériel* employed in the construction and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or, at any rate, may be preserved for a long series of years; and if ships can be thus kept without injury upon the stocks, by being built under cover, I do not see what should restrain us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and as fast as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit, and to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other articles of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of seamen who would probably enter the service at this time, or within any short period. To build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well with reference to the execution of the work as to the proper condition of the materials employed. And the costly experiment made by England, when

she too hastily increased her fleet, about thirty years ago, by building ships with improper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profitable lesson. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. Naval means should therefore be provided at a period of leisure; and be ready for immediate employment in a period of exigency; and a due regard to prudence dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demands of the service as to supply, in the shortest time, any loss occasioned by the hazards of the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmentation which is going on in all the other branches of national interest. If we assume that, at a given period, we may expect to embark in war, our capacity to man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascertain. And even then, by greater exertions, and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion may be induced to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a corresponding addition to the navy itself, but at a loss of time and expense, and a sacrifice of its permanent interest.

But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments sent out to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the consequences resulting from the ascendancy of an enemy. And the practical question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things? As I have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast, so that an enterprising foe with a victorious fleet conveying a competent force, and disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to just censure those who should project such a scheme. And on the other hand, the government would, if possible, be still more censurable, were our important maritime places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the various considerations affecting the subject.

What have we to apprehend in the event of a war? Is it within the limits of a reasonable calculation, that any enemy will be able and disposed to embark upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications, and to endeavor, by this slow and uncertain process, to obtain possession of them? I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan; the distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the conveying fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition captured or destroyed. All these are considerations which no prudent statesman, directing such an enterprise, will overlook. But beyond there is a question bearing more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any object to be attained, sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of land troops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a *coup de main*, and endeavoring to destroy its defences by a regular investment? I think there can be none.

I take it for granted that no nation would embark in the Quixotic enterprise of conquering this country. Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast, would push forward with some definite object, to be attained by a prompt movement, and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, demonstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not applicable to our condition. There military movements must be made upon great avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended by fortresses constructed with all the skill that science and experience can supply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. An invading army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient detachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the difficulties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety depends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or military, to resist or avert the coming storm. And, although, during some of the wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of military experience, and, justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced, with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt of, the strongest fortifications, the subjugation of each of which had been, till then, the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many, that this system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community.

There is also a striking difference between the political situation of those countries and that of ours, which gives to these defensive preparations a character of importance which can never apply to the United States. The possession of a capital in the eastern hemisphere is too often the possession of the kingdom. Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, and other causes, combine to give to the metropolis an undue ascendancy. Internal parties contending for superiority, and external enemies aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain possession of the seat of government. And the most careless observer of the events of the last half century must be struck with the fact that the fate of the capitals and the kingdoms of mo-

dern Europe are closely connected together. Under such circumstances, it may be prudent by powerful fortresses to bay the approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal violence.

But there is nothing like this in our country, nor can there be till there is a total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not themselves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itinerant, the result would be precisely the same. Or if, by any of the accidents of war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our commercial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property and derangement of business which would be the result, might seriously affect the community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the social or political systems of the country.—The power belongs to all, and is exercised by all.

It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an expedition against any of our cities, under the expectation that their capture and possession would lead to political results favorable to them. Washington may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion which was every where felt, when its former capture was known.—But an enemy would retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abandonment, and, if his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I make these remarks, because it seems to me that some of the principles of the European system of fortifications may possibly be transferred to this country, without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geographical and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own condition.

I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now necessary, and calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before us, to anticipate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense of their construction and preservation, but also to the greater difficulty of defending them, and the increased garrisons which must be provided and maintained. The hypothesis upon which their extent has been determined, is, that they may be exposed to investment, both seaward and landward, and that they ought to be capable of resisting a combined attack, or, in other words, that their water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army.

It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be beyond the reach of any *coup de main* that would probably be attempted against them. And this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the facility with which they can be relieved. But this proposition is far different from one to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be willing to risk something to get possession of an insulated post by a prompt movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be prepared, or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advantage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is calculated to produce; and when he is aware that he must abandon his conquest with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only undertaken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected. We have works constructed, which it would require armies to reduce. Have we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned to their magnitude?

I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain permanent possession of any part of this country. If, therefore, he succeed in overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force, and ready to risk its employment upon our territory, he can land at many points which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of practicability, but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offer itself, and there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at the nearest point to the object of his marauding enterprise. If there is such a work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry it, or to seek another, though more distant point of debarkation. I think there can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an enemy would not, under such circumstances, avoid. He would be aware of the facility of communication which our rivers, canals and rail roads afford, of the powerful use we should be prepared to make of steam in its various forms of application, and of the immense force which, in a short time, could be concentrated upon a given point; and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he would venture, formally, to besiege one of our forts, or, if he did, that he would not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet, nor the nearer proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack, would induce him to seek these advantages at the cost which must

attend the slow process of besieging a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance.

I am aware it may be objected that the weakness of a work might tempt an enemy to attack it, and that it may be supposed the power of some of our fortifications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is, the less will it be exposed to danger. But this would not furnish a sufficient reason for making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. The true inquiry is, what circumstances will probably induce and enable an enemy to assail a given point, and with what force; and how can we best meet and repel him? And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the conclusion that there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a *coup de main*. In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will be perceived that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are, both in their dimensions and construction.

What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our coast? He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of warfare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would be to gain sudden possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment, commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted. I cannot, therefore, concur in the suggestion made in the engineer report, that the first of the three great objects to be attained by the fortifications of the first class should be to "prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the temporary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgments, where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads into the country.

I refer, in these remarks, to our maritime coast generally. There are, no doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the preparation must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural highway does not, at present, allow those lateral supplies of the *personnel*, which, from geographical formation and from the state of the settlements, can be speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. This region, however, is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its principal means of defence.

To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, covers about sixty-three acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the engineer department, two thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full armament consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been desirous of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses; but the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from general Gratiot, however, that it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe which do not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his history of the siege of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress.

The object to be attained by Fort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun, intended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering Hampton roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important, because this bay is perfectly landlocked, and has sufficient depth of water for the largest vessels, and is, withal, so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary. But these works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake; nor is Hampton roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore, does not exclude an enemy from these waters, though they will compel him to resort to less convenient positions from whence to carry on his enterprises. A hostile squadron reaching the Chesapeake, and finding the entrance into Hampton roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than those at Fort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that roadstead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land troops, and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches; and this in the face of the strenuous efforts which would be made to relieve it by all the aids afforded by the most improved facilities of communication, and by the light and heavy steam-batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched upon the Chesapeake, and which during periods of calm or in certain winds, could approach the hostile ships, and drive them from their anchorage or compel them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take refuge in the inlets that other armed vessels could not

enter. And even if the works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enormous expense, nor in fact without efforts which no government three thousand miles off could well make; and all this while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappahannock, Tangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places, furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy, having the superiority, could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Chesapeake may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships. Neither of them is equal to Hampton roads, but most, or all of them furnish stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to purchase the superior advantages of Hampton roads, by the sacrifice and hazard which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure Norfolk, important as it is, from its commerce and navy yards; it only prevents the access of ships of war to it; and against these there is an interior line of defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and, if necessary, independent of, the other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down before Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but would debark at Lynnhaven bay, where there is no impediment, and march in five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk.

New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its defences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The engineer report recommends three classes of works: an exterior one for the protection of the harbor; an interior one to shut up Raritan bay; and a third to prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the city through the sound, nearer than the vicinity of Throg's point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. That of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Gravesend bay, upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brooklyn and New York. The third is proposed to be erected, in order to bar his access to the lower part of the sound, or, more accurately speaking, to prevent his reaching Hell-gate, a natural barrier, which no fleet could pass, and which is within ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts proposed to be erected at Throg's neck and Wilkins's point, eight miles further up the sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and would thus add that distance to his march, while, on the north shore, Harlem river would be interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side there would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance.

It is obvious, then, that, in the consideration of this plan, involving an estimated expenditure, in the aggregate, of \$5,807,969, and efficient garrisons, in time of war, of nine thousand men, a close investigation should be made into all the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the anchorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast, and to the doubts that may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment, to be carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorise the commencement of these works without a new examination? Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an army at Gravesend bay, in preference to some other point upon the coast of Long Island, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations? The same questions may be asked respecting Wilkins's point. The work at Throg's point is in the process of construction; and as the river is only about three-fourths of a mile wide at this place, I think its completion would be sufficient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take place.

The situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating batteries; and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the designs of an enemy, better than the full completion of the extensive system of permanent fortifications recommended, is a question deserving investigation. Such an investigation I recommend; and after all the necessary facts and considerations are presented, the government should proceed to place this commercial metropolis of the country in a state of security.

The works at Newport cover about twenty acres, and will mount 468 guns, and will need for their defence about two thousand four hundred men. I cannot, myself, foresee the existence of any circumstances which now call for a fortress of this magnitude in the very heart of New England, constructed, not merely to command the harbor of Newport, but to resist a siege which would probably, require nearly twenty thousand men to carry it on. I am at a loss to conjecture what adequate motive could induce a foreign government to detach a fleet and army upon this enterprise. The expense would be enormous. The French army that invaded Egypt was less than 40,000 men, and required for its protection and transportation between 500 and 600 vessels. The army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force, and required, it is said, about 400 transports, besides the ships of war. This scale of preparation for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean may enable us to form some conception of the arrangements that would be necessary to send across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its power, an expedition strong enough to form an

establishment upon our shores, and to furnish it with supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations.

It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an army would find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the consideration that it would afford a secure lodgment whence expeditions could be sent to every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narragansett bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile fleet, watching that part of our coast. Gardiner's bay, in that vicinity, is a most safe and convenient station, which was occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war; and it is pretty clear that it cannot be defended by any stationary fortifications that can be constructed. If it can, by floating batteries, so may Narragansett bay, and the enemy thus be prevented from occupying the latter also, without these extensive arrangements, requiring, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at an expense of one million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars, four other forts, and a sea-wall to be constructed, and eleven hundred and fifty-seven thousand dollars to be expended.

I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehension that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country, or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the most striking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is, that, under no possible circumstance, can it effect the desired object. That object, if I understand it, is not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but it is to prevent him from taking possession of a safe and convenient position, whence he could detach his forces, by means of his naval superiority, to any other part of the coast which would thus be exposed to his deprivations.

The value of Gardiner's bay as a place of naval rendezvous, I have already described. Block island, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops desiring only a lodgment; and so could Nantucket island and Martha's Vineyard, and these are only a few hours' sail from Narragansett bay. Buzzard's bay is also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended, and Martha's Vineyard sound affords commodious places of anchorage. A fleet riding in these moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and could secure its communications with its land forces, encamped upon them, which would thus be enabled, at any proper time, to throw itself upon other parts of the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rhode Island, whether an enemy, acquainted with the topography and resources of this country, would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well, and where he would be in perfect safety as long as he could maintain his naval ascendancy; and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part of the country, his tenure, in any event, would be short and difficult. I do not mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it should be; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events which are not likely to happen. As there is no naval establishment here, it is not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements exclusively connected with that object.

It will be perceived, also, that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island, on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thousand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at one thousand men. This proposition is founded, not on the value of this harbor to us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied, but on account of its importance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight. But there are many indentations upon this coast, affording safe anchorage, and which are either not capable of being defended, or, from their great number, would involve an enormous expense, which no sound views of the subject could justify. An enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon this coast. And before this expenditure of Mount Desert island is encountered, it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of some of the other roadsteads in this quarter, incapable of defence, would be sufficiently great to warrant this measure. My present impression is, that it would not.

And on the subject of roadsteads, generally, with a few exceptions, depending on their local positions, I am inclined to the opinion that any attempt to fortify them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure. But this is impracticable; and I doubt whether the circumstances in which most of them differ, give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those we cannot, as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and to maintain garrisons in them during a war.

I have adverted to these particular cases, in order to present my views more distinctly than I could do by mere general ob-

servations; certainly not from the remotest design of criticising the reports and the labors of the able professional men to whom the subject has been referred, nor of pursuing the investigation into any further detail.

I consider the duty of the government, to afford adequate protection to the seacoast, a subject of paramount obligation; and I believe we are called upon, by every consideration of policy, to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should be defended by works fixed or floating, suited local to its position, and sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject, I would give to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after the proper limitations are established. These relate, principally, to the magnitude of the works; and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to, and must be capable of resisting the attacks of a European army, with its battering train, and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought into conflict, can justify us in such an anticipation. All the defences should be projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should be calculated to resist any naval attack, and any sudden assault that a body of land troops might make upon them.

But further than this, it appears to me we ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile point, at Fort Jackson and at Baltimore, during the late war, show that formidable armaments may be successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not furnish examples to be followed, as to the scale of our preparations; but they show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships of war.

It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a naval force from our harbors. This end they ought fully to answer; and in this problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled:

1st. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be placed against them; and

2d. That they be also able to resist any *coup de main* or esca-lade which might be attempted by land.

An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition, but not the second, and therefore these works should be closed and regularly constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the magnitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated, and those required to resist, successfully, a formal investment, will sometimes become a matter of doubt; nor that circumstances may not be stated which might induce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these works, because its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with relation to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily large, they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for their defence, independently of the additional expense in their construction. It is principally, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the doubts which I have expressed upon this point.

Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers, was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be assembled upon one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be prepared, at every important point, to resist the first shock of such a force. I have already glanced at the reasons, geographical, political, financial and prudential, which, in my opinion, leave little room to expect that any enemy will, hereafter, project an enterprise of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertain in its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be attained. And the suggestion which was made by the board, of defending the city of Washington, by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent, proceeds upon similar views. Our navy, our floating batteries, our means of communication and concentration, seem to me far better adapted to the defence of this city, than forts at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, if an enemy were resolved upon the enterprise, would be to compel him to make a *detour* in his expedition, or which would send him to some part of the coast of the bay between the Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further from Washington, than at the head of navigation of the Patuxent.

Even during the last war, when the navy of Great Britain rode triumphant upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an entrance into a fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force which can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral considerations must also have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of security. So are the dangers of dispersion, and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant

expedition, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or march.

In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the consideration of congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its future prosecution can now be settled. The plan originally devised was recommended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and above all, we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences; and it was to be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned upon the then existing state of things. I imagine there were few who did not concur in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the wonderful advancement of the country in all the elements of power, and from the development of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary at this time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original measure. And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful; but the experience we have acquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans proposed for the prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change which has taken place in the condition of the country will not justify a corresponding change in the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not depend more upon floating, and less upon stationary defences.

During the period which has intervened since the last war, we have nearly doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased in a still greater ratio. Certainly, some of the facilities and means of defence are augmented beyond any rational expectations. The power of transporting troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject; and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercommunication, that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical force may be thrown, in a few hours, upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may succor New Orleans in sixty hours; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the same time, Pittsburgh will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore, and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morning, and meet in New York in the evening. This wonderful capacity for movement increases, in effect, some of the most important elements of national power. It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detachments liable, under former circumstances, to be cut off in detail, may now be concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration, be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them.

The improvements which are making in the application of steam, have furnished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such as the bays of New York, of the Delaware, and of the Chesapeake, they will be found indispensable; and one of the most important advantages to be anticipated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shelter in Hampton roads. A hostile fleet, about to enter the Chesapeake, would certainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by these formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position, insuring their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and destroy the enemy; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost all circumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necessary, where they could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would anchor in the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these batteries were maintained and placed in proper positions.

These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such extensive permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted justifies the views which then prevailed; and without advancing any rash conjecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this branch of the public service as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels, properly constructed, may become floating forts almost equal to permanent fortifications in their power of annoyance and defence, and in other advantages far superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can be united upon any point, and a few of them be thus enabled to protect various places. We have been brought by circumstances to a more rigid investigation of our means of defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an interval of twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the government were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this matter. The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subject can be now re-examined by congress, with all the benefits which much experience has brought, and with the advantage of adapting the system to the advanced state of the country.

There are two bills for fortifications now pending before congress. One before the house, amounting to \$2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works already actually commenced. The estimates for this bill may therefore be considered necessary in themselves; under any view of the general subject, and not unreasonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half, as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered requisite when the estimates were prepared.

The bill pending before the senate contains appropriations for nineteen new works, and for the sum of \$600,000, to be expended for steam batteries. The estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from that which now exists. An examination of the general system of defence was not then expedient; and the means of protecting the most exposed points, agreeably to information previously collected, were asked of congress. It was no time then to stop, and, instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously, to lose the period of action by surveys, and examinations, and discussions. But the opportunity is now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying the principles suggested to the works under consideration.

It cannot be doubted but that fortifications at the following places, enumerated in this bill, will be necessary:

At Penobscot bay, for the protection of Bangor, &c.

At Kennebec river.

At Portland.

At Portsmouth.

At Salem.

At New Bedford.

At New London.

Upon Staten Island.

At Sollers's Flats.

A redoubt on Federal Point.

For the Barancas.

For Fort St. Philip.

These proposed works all command the approach to places sufficiently important to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made, such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances, if any change be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination, can commence immediately, and that of the others, as soon as the plans are determined upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations.

The other works contained in this bill are—

For Provincetown—And this proposition may be safely submitted to another inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massachusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown, are closely connected.

For Rhode Island, Narragansett bay—This work may await the result of the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay.

For a work at the Delaware, outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal—This may be postponed without injury till next season; and, in the mean time, a project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the size of the proposed work reduced.

For a work at the Breakwater—Until the effect of the deposits which are going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, perhaps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable, an adequate fortification should be constructed here without delay.

For a fort on the Patuxent river. (Both of these works are

For a fort at Cedar Point. liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better be postponed for more mature consideration.

For fortifications at the mouth of the St. Mary's, Georgia—This proposition may also be safely submitted to examination.

The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to \$100,000. That sum can be profitably employed.

If these appropriations are early made, most, if not all, these works can be put in operation this season, and the money usefully applied, as fast as their progress will justify; and, I think, the measure would be expedient. But it is to be remembered that the power of the department to push them, during the present year, will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If that corps is not increased, it will be unnecessary to make the appropriations in the bill before the senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be sufficient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps.

Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifications generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of \$30,000 be made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c.

My reflections upon the whole subject lead to the following practical suggestions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country:

1. An augmentation of the navy, upon the principles before stated.

2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia.

Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay before you, either with relation to its general importance, or to the necessary practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can engage the attention of congress; and the day that sees a plan of organization adopted suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions, and fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a competent knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipline and subordination, will see us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of the globe. Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature.

3. The cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the improvements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-eminent advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and many an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it; and the European communities have such a relation to one another, that the profession of arms is peculiarly encouraged, and every effort made to place their military establishments, not at the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient service, both with respect to its *morale* and *materiel*. It is not by the mere reading of professional authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge can be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principle and details, which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this object. This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the military academy. It cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the theatre of action at the commencement of the last war, that the first year was almost spent in a series of disaster, which, however, brought their advantages. We were comparatively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did not fully recover our true position till we had received many severe lessons; at what an expense of life and treasure need not be stated.

4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of expansion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly organized force. This object is attained by our present army.

5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war, agreeably to the views hereinafter submitted.

6. I think all the defensive works now in the process of construction should be finished, agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected.

7. All the harbors and inlets upon the coast, where there are cities or towns whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack, and particularly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by works proportioned to any exigency that may probably arise.

Having already presented my general views upon this branch of the inquiry, I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination should be made, in every case, in order to apply these principles to the proposed plan of operations, and thus reduce the expense of construction where this can properly be done, and, also, the eventual expense of maintaining garrisons required to defend works disproportioned to the objects sought to be attained. I would organize a board for this object, with special instructions for its government.

8. Provision should be made for the necessary experiments, to test the superiority of the various plans that may be offered for the construction and use of steam batteries; I mean batteries to be employed as accessories in the defence of the harbors and inlets, and in aid of the permanent fortifications.

The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders it expedient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, connected with this class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improvement of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow; and modes of application may be discovered, before any exigency arises, rendering a resort to these defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution into this department of art and industry. Still, however, experiments should be made, and a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water, their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery, the number, calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engines to be used, are questions requiring much consideration, and which can only be determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen, and lead to the tender of plans, practically suited to the circumstances. As we acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable change, which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of steam.

9. I recommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roadsteads or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future circumstances of the country.

And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of injury or insult, as soon as a just regard to circumstances will permit. No objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work. In fact, the cost will be greater the longer we are employed in it, not only for obvious reasons, arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies, but because accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured; and the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary which would not have been required had no interruption happened.

But the political considerations which urge forward this great object are entitled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude, during the past season, at our comparatively defenceless condition, when the issue of our discussions with France was uncertain; and who did not regret that our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not kept pace with our growth and importance. We have now this lesson to add to our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowledge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as well in the advent of war itself as in the mode of conducting it. If we are prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hostilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected commerce, a defenceless coast, and a military marine, wholly inadequate to the wants of our service, would indeed hold out strong inducements to other nations to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel.

There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works, which I venture to make:

First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this measure have been heretofore submitted, and the proposition has been recommended by you to congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the duties committed to them; and that if an augmentation does not take place, the public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary consideration connected with this increase. And,

Secondly. I think that, when the plan of a work has been approved by congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations has had upon the expense of the works, would probably exhibit an amount far greater than is generally anticipated.

The report from the ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of the munitions of war, estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preservation. The conjectural amount is \$29,955,537.

Believing it is not expedient, at present, to make any preparations upon a scale of this magnitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with a brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that are presented in this document.

As our fortifications are constructed, their armaments should be provided; and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon for seacoast defence, and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless or of doubtful character. The works actually finished, or so far completed as to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, require about 2,000 guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others in the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certain data for our estimates; unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should not be found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the largest of these works. Beyond this the subject is conjectural. And the quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted in the further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private foundries at which the public cannon are cast. These, if their whole attention were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually. As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a reasonable period is almost indefinite. Iron carriages are now made for all the casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestructibility from the atmosphere, but requiring no seasoned materials, they may be supplied by the foundries through the country to almost any extent.

We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven private establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these supplies are of the best description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which prevents imposition. The armories can at present turn out about 27,000 arms annually, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private establishments. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can be much increased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and there have been issued to the states about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles, 30,000 pistols and 378 field cannon and carriages, under the act for arming the militia. If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the country 800,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or state governments.

What may be considered a proper supply, is a question admitting much difference of opinion. It will be seen that the ordnance department fixes the amount at about 600,000, in addition to what are now on hand, and including the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the various arsenals. The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had been lost in the service. This consumption was greater, I think, than was necessary, or than would probably again take place. A plan of accountability has been introduced, by which the men are charged with the arms they receive; and if these are improperly lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted.

The stock of small arms in Great Britain, in depot, in 1817, was 818,282
In the public service..... 200,974

Total..... 1,019,256
The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 600,000, not including the great number in service.

My own impression is, that 1,000,000 small arms may be considered a competent supply for the United States; and if so, a large deduction may be made from the estimate of the ordnance department, under this head of expenditure. Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand; because there is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but, because, like every other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great improvement. And it may be that those now made may be superseded by an improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited in this city, by which a series of balls in separate charges are brought, by a rotary motion, to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a revolution in the form of our fire-arms.

On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased, and arms placed in every part of the country, ready to be used as circumstances may require.

It will be observed that, in the estimate I have made, I confine myself to the armament for the public service, connected with the actual defence of the country, whether to be used by the army or militia in time of war; but I do not extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the consideration of the subject before me.

As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, therefore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the ordnance department, are not wanted. And, indeed, although there are considerations attending the transportation of the crude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters at present, yet, if the measure is not carried into effect soon, its importance will annually diminish.

But a national foundry for cannon, both for the military and naval service, and perhaps two, in different sections of the country, should be erected without delay. The best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report.

As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place, I think the expenditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider all attempts to improve the condition of the militia upon the present plan as so nearly useless, that the whole system has become a burden upon the public, without any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which results from the existing state of things, is the power to call into service such portions of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple classification, without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less. Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c. LEW. CASS.

The president of the United States.